Chapter 13: Administrative Law by Healey, Henry S.
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1967 Article 13
1-1-1967
Chapter 10: Administrative Law: The Use of the
Declaratory Judgment to Secure Judicial Review of
Administrative Action
N. Peter Lareau
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Administrative Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Lareau, N. Peter (1967) "Chapter 10: Administrative Law: The Use of the Declaratory Judgment to Secure Judicial Review of
Administrative Action," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1967, Article 13.
CHAPTER 10 
Administrative Law: The Use of the 
Declaratory Judgment to Secure Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action 
§1O.1. Introduction. In 1945, the declaratory judgment statute, 
General Laws, Chapter 231A, was enacted. While the act provided a 
remedy that was useful in all areas of litigation, it proved particularly 
useful in securing judicial review of administrative action. Prior to 
the enactment of the statute, the practitioner had to resort to the 
extraordinary writs whenever no specific statutory remedy was pro-
vided.1 These writs were exceedingly technical and intricate, placing 
heavy emphasis on procedural form; failure to select the correct writ 
frequently resulted in dismissal of the petition.2 The declaratory 
judgment statute eliminated the need to resort to the extraordinary 
writs by establishing only two prerequisites for securing relief under 
Chapter 231A: (1) an actual controversy must be present;3 and (2) all 
necessary parties must be joined.4 These requirements represent mini-
mal requisites for maintaining any action.5 As a result, the declaratory 
judgment won widespread acceptance as the primary remedy to secure 
judicial review of administrative action. 
The State Administrative Procedure Act, General Laws, Chapter 
30A, enacted in 1955, slightly altered the reliance upon declaratory 
judgments to secure review of administrative action.6 The Act con-
tained two sections dealing with judicial review.7 Chapter 30A, Sec-
tion 14 provided for review of final agency decisions in adjudicatory 
§IO.1. 1 These extraordinary writs were widely employed since, in Massachu-
setts, there were few statutory provisions setting forth particular methods of 
review. For an excellent discussion of extraordinary writs and the problems in-
volved, see Brown, The Use of Extraordinary Legal and Equitable Remedies to 
Review Executive and Administrative Action in Massachusetts, 21 B.U.L. Rev. 
632, 22 B.U.L. Rev. 55 (1941-1942). 
2 Brown, note 1 supra, 22 B.U.L. Rev. at 91. 
3 G.L., c. 231A, §1. 
4Id. §8. 
5 See Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 25-26, 29, 256 (2d ed. 1941). 
6 As is indicated in the 1962 Massachusetts Attorney General's Annual Report 
43-64, the problem of determining what agencies are subject to the State Admin-
istrative Procedure Act is extremely complex. This chapter is not concerned solely 
with administrative bodies subject to the Act but also with agencies of purely 
local jurisdiction. 
7 G.L., c. 30A, §§7, 14. 
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proceedings by merely filing a petition for review, and thus eliminated 
the need to resort to the declaratory judgment remedy in these cases. 
On the other hand, Chapter 30A, Section 7, specifically retained the 
declaratory judgment as the method of reviewing agency regulations. 
Regulations and final adjudicatory decisions were the only agency 
actions for which the State Administrative Procedure Act specified a 
method of review.8 As to the method of reviewing other agency ac-
tions, such as advisory opinions, the Act remained silent. The courts, 
however, did not construe the State Administrative Procedure Act as 
precluding review of these other actions but, instead, allowed review 
of such actions through petitions for declaratory relie£.9 
Although the declaratory judgment is today the primary method of 
securing judicial review of administrative actions other than final ad· 
judicatory decisions, the courts have encountered problems in deter-
mining when a particular agency action is ripe for review under Chap-
ter 231A. Specifically, problems have arisen as to: (1) whether an actual 
controversy exists; (2) whether petitioner should be required to ex-
haust his administrative remedies; and (3) whether a decree would 
terminate the controversy. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
the Supreme Judicial Court's resolution of these questions with a 
view towards determining the trends of the recent Massachusetts cases. 
§IO.2. Actual controversy. In one of the earliest cases arising 
under the declaratory judgment statute,l the Supreme Judicial Court 
attempted to define the requirement that an actual controversy must 
have arisen and have been specifically set forth in the pleadings: 
We think a pleading is sufficient if it sets forth a real dispute 
caused by the assertion by one party of a legal relation, status or 
right in which he has a definite interest, and the denial of such 
assertion by another party also having a definite interest in the 
subject matter, where the circumstances attending the dispute 
plainly indicate that unless the matter is adjusted such antagonis-
tic claims will almost immediately and inevitably lead to litiga-
tion.2 
8 Regulation is defined broadly to include "the whole or any part of every rule, 
regulation, standard or other requirement of general application and future 
effect .... " C.L., c. 30A, §1(5). The definition specifically excludes advisory rul· 
ings and decisions reached in adjudicatory proceedings. Id. §§1(5)(a), (e). Adjudica-
tory proceeding is defined as a proceeding before an agency in which a specifically 
named person's legal rights, duties, or privileges are required by constitutional 
right or statutory provision to be determined after an agency hearing. Id. §l (I). 
Since C.L., c. 30A, §14 provides for review of "final" decisions, it would appear to 
preclude use of the section to review interlocutory or intermediate decisions. 
9 See Westland Housing Corp. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 1967 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 655, 660-663, 225 N.E.2d 782, 787-788. See Metropolitan Dist. Police Relief 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 347 Mass. 686, 200 N.E.2d 245 (1964). 
§10.2. 1 School Committee of Cambridge v. Superintendent of Schools of Cam-
bridge, 320 Mass. 516, 70 N.E.2d 298 (1946). 
2Id. at 518, 70 N.E.2d at 300. 
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This definition sets forth three rather vague tests, each of which must 
be met, in order to have an actual controversy: (1) whether one party 
has asserted and another party denied a legal relation, status, or right; 
(2) whether both parties have a definite interest in the subject matter; 
and (3) whether the problem is almost certain to lead to litigation 
unless declaratory relief is granted. Further definition of each of these 
tests can be obtained only by examining what the courts have done in 
specific cases. 
Since a petition for judicial review of administrative action is a 
denial, by the petitioner, of a claimed agency assertion, the issue posed 
by the first test becomes whether the agency action can be considered 
an assertion of the agency. By definition, an agency makes an asser-
tion whenever it states an opinion to the public or to the party re-
questing it, as in issuing a regulation or advisory ruling.3 The question, 
thus, may be narrowed still further to whether such actions as state-
ments made by agency employees to the agency as part of the investi-
gatory process are assertions of the agency. 
In Frontier Research Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Safety,4 a fire 
occurred in petitioner's chemical manufacturing plant. An assistant 
chemist, employed by the Department of Public Safety, investigated the 
fire and filed two conflicting reports. If the first report were adopted 
by the agency, the manufacturer would be required to obtain a license 
from the local board of selectmen and a permit from the town fire chief 
in order to continue operations. If the second report were adopted, 
the manufacturer would only need the selectmen's license. The agency, 
however, could adopt a regulation the effect of which would require 
the manufacturer to secure a permit from the local fire chief. The 
manufacturer filed a petition for declaratory relief, alleging that the 
reports had caused it uncertainty with respect to its rights and duties in 
regard to the licensing and permit provisions. The bill sought a dec-
laration that petitioner was not required to obtain either a license or 
a permit to continue operations and that the respondent could not in 
the future adopt a regulation which would force petitioner to obtain a 
permit. 
In answer to an allegation by the respondent that petitioner was 
barred from relief for failure to pursue certain administrative reme-
dies, the Supreme Judicial Court found that there had been no of-
ficial communication of the reports to the petitioner. It further found: 
"No official departmental action on the basis of either report has been 
shown to have been taken or proposed."5 The Court, therefore, con-
cluded that the mere existence of the reports was not sufficient to 
require the petitioner to resort to the administrative remedies. It 
granted relief, however, because of the "uncertainties (a) caused by the 
3 See, e.g., Metropolitan Dist. Police Relief Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Insur-
ance, 347 Mass. 686, 200 N.E.2d 245 (1964). 
41967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 137, 222 N.E.2d 854. 
5Id. at 139, 222 N.E.2d at 855. 
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reports and their effect upon Frontier's business and (b) concerning 
the action appropriate for Frontier to take .... "6 
The Court, in granting declaratory relief, either found that the 
report of the assistant chemist was an assertion of the agency, or dis-
pensed with the assertion requirement, the first test proposed in its 
definition of an actual controversy. This appears to be the first case 
which allows review of an employee's investigatory report. 
There are strong reasons why review of an investigatory report to 
an agency should not be allowed. During the course of any administra-
tive investigation, reports will be submitted by the employees of the 
agency which may be both favorable and unfavorable to the parties 
involved. These reports are not meant to be an assertion of the 
agency's position but to aid the agency in reaching a position. To 
grant review merely because a report adverse to petitioner has been 
submitted, allows the courts to "short-circuit" the administrative 
process by making the decision which initially is within the jurisdic-
tion and expertise of the agency. 
There is, however, reason to expect that the Frontier case will have 
limited application. The local selectmen and fire chief, acting in-
dependently of the agency, had asserted that the petitioner must ob-
tain a license and a permit from them in order to continue operations. 
This fact does not appear to have been specifically set forth in the 
pleadings and, moreover, these individuals were not parties to the 
litigation. Had these circumstances been specifically pleaded and these 
parties included in the bill, the Court would have had before it an 
assertion which would have satisfied the first test set forth in the 
definition of actual controversy. The Court's decision might, then, be 
justified on two bases. First, had the Court remanded the case to the 
lower court and required that the local selectmen and fire chief be 
joined, the parties would have been faced with increased expenditures 
of time and money and yet would probably not have litigated the 
matter more fully. Second, possible injury to the petitioner could be 
avoided by settling the issues as they were presented. While Frontier 
illustrates that a flexible application of rules to meet a situation before 
a court is desirable, the case creates great uncertainty as to whether an 
assertion by the agency will be required in the future. 
The second test in determining the existence of an actual con-
troversy is whether the parties have a definite interest in the subject 
matter. By requiring a definite interest, the Court assures that the 
parties will be motivated to litigate fully the actual issues, and that 
judicial time will not be squandered resolving abstract questions. In 
light of these purposes, it is clear that the administrative body has 
such a definite interest in the validity of its action which is chal-
lenged. It is much less clear whether any given petitioner has such 
an interest. The resolution of this problem should always be made 
with regard to the purposes of this test. 
6Id. at 139, 222 N.E.2d at 856. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1967 [1967], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1967/iss1/13
§IO.2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 179 
There is some question in Massachusetts whether a petitioner who 
seeks to challenge an administrative action solely because it has in-
jured him economically by increasing his competition is considered 
to have a definite interest. When an agency grants a license to a party 
to establish a business, it can increase the competition not only of 
those parties subject to its regulation but also of those parties not 
subject to its regulation. Thus, regardless of whether a party is subject 
to the regulation of the agency, he may be affected by the increase in 
competition. The question becomes whether the mere fact that the 
party is affected by the increase in competition will give him the 
requisite interest to review the agency action by declaratory relief. 
In Nantucket Boat Inc. v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and 
Nantucket s.s. Auth'y,7 the petitioner had furnished water transporta-
tion between Hyannis and Nantucket since 1946. Early in the 1960's, 
the respondent authority agreed to grant a license to a competitor of 
the petitioner to operate between these same two points. Arguing that 
he had standing to challenge because he would be economically in-
jured by the competition, the petitioner sought a declaration that the 
license was invalidly granted. The petitioner himself was not subject 
to the regulation by the agency and was not required to obtain a 
license which was necessary only for boats above a certain tonnage.8 
The Court refused relief, stating: "Apart from special circumstances 
... , one injured by [business] competition has no standing to main-
tain a proceeding ... "9 attacking the agency's action. 
It is difficult to see what purpose this rule serves. The petitioner in 
Nantucket Boat was in danger of incurring economic loss because of 
the increased competition created by the agency's action. Economic 
loss presents concrete, as opposed to abstract, issues and strongly sug-
gests that the party will fully litigate the issues. The economic interest 
in being free from illegally created competition thus fulfills the pur-
poses of the second test, and there appears no good reason why such a 
person should not be held to have a definite interest in the subject 
matter. 
The premise of the Nantucket Boat rule may be founded on earlier 
statements by the Court that unless one of the purposes of the statu-
tory scheme is to protect the individual's competitive status, the peti-
tioner has no private right to be protected from impairment of his 
competitive position, and that, absent such a private right, the peti-
tioner has no definite interest.10 The statutory purposes would be 
relevant to the substantive issues raised by a complaint, but it is dif-
ficult to see what relevance they bear to the procedural aspects of the 
7345 Mass. 551, 188 N.E.2d 476 (1963). 
8 Acts of 1960, c. 701, §5. 
9345 Mass. at 554, 188 N.E.2d at 478. The issues of standing and actual contro-
versy are closely related. See South Shore Nat'! Bank v. Board of Bank Incorpora-
tion, 351 Mass. 363, 368, 220 N.E.2d 899, 901 (1966). 
10 E.g., Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 324 Mass. 
427, 429·432, 86 N.E.2d 920, 922-923 (1949). 
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case. In requiring that the petitioner allege more than a distinct in-
jury caused by illegal agency action in order to meet the definite 
interest test, the Court is contravening the legislative dictate that the 
Declaratory Judgment Act be liberally interpretedll and is setting up 
a technical rule that achieves no valid objective. 
The rule in Nantucket Boat is qualified by the phrase "apart from 
special circumstances." The Court found such circumstances in the 
recent case of South Shore National Bank v. Board of Bank Incorpora-
tion.12 The petitioner alleged that it had standing because its applica-
tion to the Federal Comptroller of the Currency for permission to 
establish a branch office in Cohasset had been adversely affected by 
the Board's decision to allow another bank to establish a branch office 
in the same area. In granting declaratory relief, the Court held that 
the special circumstances present in this case justified a departure 
from the Nantucket Boat rule. The Court reasoned that petitioner 
was part of an industry in which competition is regulated and that: 
When considering changes in branch office location . . . , the 
board must take into account the effect such moves will have on 
competition between banks, under the broad requirement that 
the "public convenience" be served. Certainly a bank whose com-
petitive position is endangered by the board's approval of a 
change in location of a branch of a competing bank has a suf-
ficient interest in the board's action to bring this suit.13 
It might be argued that South Shore is an entirely consistent ap-
plication of the premise underlying the Nantucket Boat rule. Com-
petition between banks is regulated, in part, to prevent banks which 
could not meet unrestricted competition from failing and causing a 
loss of public funds. To achieve this objective, a bank's competitive 
position must, to some extent, be protected. On this basis, South Shore 
could be read as holding that the petitioner had a definite interest 
because protection of a bank's competitive position was a statutory 
purpose. 
In South Shore, however, the Court did not deal with the issue 
solely in terms of statutory purpose. It appeared, in addition, to rea-
son that petitioner's ability to compete would be limited by the fact 
that it was subject to agency regulation and that, therefore, the peti-
tioner's interest in the agency's action was definite enough to allow it 
to protect itself against an increase in competition due to illegal 
agency action. Apparently, the mere fact that the petitioner was sub-
ject to agency regulation would be sufficient to give him the neces-
sary interest to seek review. There would, thus, be no need to look to 
whether the statutory purpose was to protect his competitive position. 
South Shore, as thus construed, would not be in conflict with Nan-
tucket Boat because the petitioner in the latter case was not subject 
11 G.L., c. 231A, §9. 
12351 Mass. 363, 220 N.E.2d 899. 
13Id. at 367·368, 220 N.E.2d at 902. 
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to regulation. Since in many cases, however, the individual challenging 
the agency will be subject to agency regulation, South Shore can be 
construed as greatly expanding the Nantucket Boat rule. 
A reconsideration of the Nantucket Boat rule would be preferable 
from both the petitioner's and the public's viewpoint. The administra-
tive agency today has attained a position of enormous influence and 
power in constructing governmental policy affecting the daily lives of 
every citizen. One of the strongest restraints against abuse of this 
power and influence is the ability of the citizen to challenge ad-
ministrative action judicially. Yet, at the same time that the ad-
ministrative body has increased its position in the governmental 
structure, it has necessarily moved away from the general cognizance 
of the public. Today the individual citizen is not likely to be aware 
of the particular actions of an agency, let alone be willing to assume 
the expenditure of time and money to challenge them. Holding that 
an individual whose competitive position is endangered has a definite 
interest in the subject matter not only will service the legitimate 
interest of the complaining party but will also protect the public in-
terest against illegal and unauthorized agency action. 
This approach finds support in the federal case of FCC v. Sanders 
Bros. Radio Station.14 There petitioner had been operating a radio 
station and the FCC granted permission to another party to broad-
cast in the same area. Sanders appealed the grant of the permit under 
a statute which permitted appeal by an aggrieved person, alleging he 
had standing because of the economic injury due to increased com-
petition. The United States Supreme Court held that the FCC had to 
consider competition only as it might affect the public interest and 
that Sanders had no private right to be free from competition. Yet it 
held that the petitioner had standing to sue because a competitor 
who was financially injured would be the one most likely to challenge 
the agency and thereby to protect the public against illegal or unau-
thorized agency actions,1li Although the Supreme Judicial Court has 
cited the Sanders case with approval in earlier cases,16 the Sanders 
doctrine has not yet been specifically adopted. Had it been applied in 
Nantucket Boat, the petitioner would have been held to have a definite 
interest in the subject matter. South Shore, however, may represent a 
step in the Sanders direction. 
The third and final standard proposed by the Court in determining 
whether an actual controversy exists is whether the problem is almost 
certain to lead to litigation unless declaratory relief is granted. Al-
though most litigation cannot be brought until an injury occurs, 
under Chapter 231A, Section I, declaratory relief can be granted before 
an injury actually occurs. Thus by requiring that litigation be im-
minent, the Court essentially is requiring that the injury be imminent. 
14309 U.S. 470 (1940). 
15 Id. at 477. 
16 A. B. and C. Motor Transportation Co., Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities, 
327 Mass. 550, 552, 100 N.E.2d 560, 561 (1951). 
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In Kelley v. Board of Registration in Optometry,17 the Attorney 
General, in response to a request from the defendant Board, rendered 
an advisory opinion that the fitting of contact lenses by opticians con-
stituted the unauthorized practice of optometry and was therefore 
unlawful. The petitioners, opticians, brought suit against the Board 
for a declaration that opticians could lawfully fit contact lenses. In 
refusing declaratory relief, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that al-
though it is proper to seek relief against a party who can regulate the 
petitioners' activities, such was not the case here; the Board had no 
power to regulate the activities of opticians. This finding provided 
sufficient basis for refusing relief. Since the Board could not enforce 
the advisory opinion of the Attorney General, it could not harm the 
petitioners and, therefore, as between these two parties, the petitioner 
could not contend that there was an imminent threat of injury. 
The Court went on to say, however: "That the Attorney General 
has rendered an opinion does not, of itself, raise the matter to the 
dignity of a justiciable controversy. There are currently in force 
statutes which provide substantial penalties for the illegal practice 
of optometry."18 Finally, the Court noted, "there is no evidence that 
the Attorney General has acted upon the opinion."19 This dictum 
seems to indicate that even had the opticians sought relief against the 
Attorney General, instead of the Board, the Court still would have 
refused relief because, although the Attorney General had asserted 
that the petitioners' practice was unlawful, he had not yet taken any 
steps to enforce that assertion. It should be noted that this dictum 
would sub silentio overrule prior precedent in Massachusetts. Massa-
chusetts has granted review of advisory opinions even where there was 
no indication that the party issuing the opinion had started to act 
upon it or had even threatened to act upon it.20 
It is submitted that these precedents should continue to be adhered 
to in the future. To require a party to wait until there is enforcement, 
or threatened enforcement of the asserted opinion would place him 
in an unnecessarily precarious position in contravention of the stated 
policy of Chapter 231A, which is "to remove, and to afford relief from, 
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, duties, status, and 
other legal relations .... "21 If the petitioner is required to wait until 
enforcement, he is placed in the position of either continuing the 
status quo and risking fines and criminal penalties or of complying 
with the opinion and undergoing great financial loss. It is exactly this 
situation which the liberal, remedial function of Chapter 231A is 
intended to eliminate. 
The Supreme Judicial Court attempted to bypass the above argu-
17351 Mass. 187, 218 N.E.2d 130 (1966). 
18Id. at 192, 218 N.E.2d at 133. 
19Id. 
20 E.g., Metropolitan Dist. Police Relief Assn., Inc. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 
347 Mass. 686, 200 N.E.2d 245 (1964). 
21 G.L., c. 231A, §9. 
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ment by pointing out that there have been statutes in force providing 
substantial penalties for the unauthorized practice of optometry. The 
rationale would be that the Attorney General's opinion merely re-
stated the law and did not increase the likelihood of a confrontation. 
This argument assumes that the law had been clear before the ad-
visory opinion. If in fact it was not, then the ruling of the Attorney 
General would substantially increase the likelihood that the peti-
tioners would be prosecuted under the statute. 
The dictum in Kelley does not appear to have been applied as yet. 
Some doubt on this question is raised by McCaffrey v. School Commit-
tee of Haverhill.22 There the petitioners were teachers who had formed 
an educational association at which they worked outside of their regu-
lar school work hours. They sought declaratory relief, alleging that 
the respondents had ordered them to discontinue work with the 
outside association, that they believed the respondents would expel 
them from the school system if they did not cease such work, that the 
respondents had "suspended" them, and that the respondents had 
refused the petitioners counsel and the hearing to which they were 
entitled under General Laws, Chapter 71, Section 42. 
The decision denying relief, as well as the allegations of the com-
plaint, are unclear. The Court conceivably could have found that the 
allegations failed to allege that any disciplinary action had been taken 
or threatened and denied relief on that ground. Thus the case would 
represent an application of the Kelley dictum. The more reasonable 
interpretation of the case is that the Court construed the allegations 
dealing with the respondents' action to mean that if the petitioners 
did not cease their outside work, the respondents would be forced to 
investigate the matter more thoroughly to see if disciplinary action 
was called for. Since the respondents had not asserted that the peti-
tioners would be subject to disciplinary action and since the respon-
dents had not yet decided to take any action, the petitioners were not 
in any imminent danger of injury. The McCaffrey case would thus be 
distinguishable from the Kelley dictum. In Kelley, the Attorney Gen-
eral had asserted the petitioners' conduct was unlawful and subject to 
disciplinary action, whereas in McCaffrey, respondents had not decided 
whether the petitioners' conduct was wrongful or subject to disciplinary 
action. 
These cases dealing with what constitutes an actual controversy il-
lustrate that the current Court, instead of limiting itself to a rigid 
application of technical rules, has taken a flexible approach to reach 
what it considers the most desirable result in each case. For example, 
in Frontier, the Court ignored the assertion requirement in order to 
remove the uncertainties raised by the assistant chemist's reports. And 
although the general rule is that the interest in preserving one's 
competitive position is not a definite interest, the Court is willing, as 
in South Shore, to recognize special circumstances which will justify 
221967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 825, 226 N.E.2d 232. 
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a departure from this rule. These cases further indicate that the 
Court has been primarily concerned with whether a decree will 
eliminate uncertainties and prevent potential injury. In focusing on 
petitioner's interests, however, the Court has not given due weight to 
the effective functioning of the administrative process. Thus, in Fron-
tier, the Court granted relief against an agency although the agency 
was still in the process of investigation. Although the current Court 
has adopted a liberal approach to determining the existence of an 
actual controversy, there is dictum in Kelley which would add the un-
necessary requirement of a threat of enforcement before review of an 
advisory opinion would be granted. The Kelley dictum, however, has 
yet to be adopted. 
The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the Court's 
approach to two arguments frequently raised by the agencies to pre-
vent court review of their action: (1) the petitioner has failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies; and (2) a decree would not 
terminate the controversy. 
§lO.3. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. The doctrine of 
exhaustion requires the complaining party to pursue all adequate and 
available administrative remedies before seeking judicial relie£.1 The 
purpose of the doctrine is to preserve an orderly timetable between 
the administrative body and the court and to give the agency full 
opportunity to consider the issues before it.2 
The exhaustion rule is not specifically mentioned in the Declara-
tory Judgment Act. As is obvious from the Court's treatment of the 
rule, however, the rule falls within Section 3 of the statute, which 
provides that the Court may in its discretion refuse declaratory relief 
for sufficient reasons. 
In St. Luke's Hospital v. Labor Relations Commissions a trade un-
ion filed a petition with the Commission seeking certification as the 
bargaining agency of certain non-professional employees of the hos-
pital. A hearing was held on the petition, at which the hospital 
appeared and moved to dismiss on the ground that the Commission 
had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Before the Commission 
had decided the jurisdictional question, the hospital brought an ac-
tion for a declaratory decree seeking to have the Commission adjudged 
without jurisdiction. Although the Court noted, "the general rule 
that one must first exhaust his remedies before an administrative board 
... before he may invoke judicial interference with the action of the 
board,"4 and that "the instances are rare where circumstances will 
require such interference,"5 the Court was willing to grant relief 
because both parties had requested a declaration on the substantive 
issue. Since the Court was willing to dispense with exhaustion, the 
§lO.!I. 1 Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 424 (1965). 
2 Id. at 424-426. 
3 !l20 Mass. 467, 70 N.E.2d 10 (1946). 
4Id. at 469, 70 N.E.2d at 12. 
1\ Id. at 470, 70 N.E.2d at 12. 
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Court must have considered its application to be discretionary under 
Chapter 231A, Section 3. 
The Court's definition of the exhaustion doctrine in the St. Luke's 
dictum quoted above has never been strictly applied by the Court. In 
Meenes v. Goldberg,6 the petitioner sought a declaratory decree as to 
the validity of a sewer assessment. The respondent demurred on the 
ground that the petitioner had adequate administrative remedies by 
paying the tax under protest and then recovering it in an abate-
ment proceeding. Although the Court recognized that previous cases 
had required a showing of extraordinary circumstances before judicial 
intervention would be warranted, it granted declaratory relief. In 
doing so it stated: 
But the most convincing reason for sustaining the bill is found in 
G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 23lA ... setting up the present procedure for 
declaratory judgments. Section 9 of this chapter makes it par-
ticularly plain that the statute is to be "liberally construed and 
administered" "to remove, and to afford relief from, uncertainty 
and insecurity with respect to rights, duties, status and other legal 
relations." Commonly relief under this chapter should not be 
denied because of the possibility of some other form of remedy, 
if the case presented comes within the general scope of the chapter 
and no special reasons exist against the use of the declaratory 
process.7 
Thus, rather than require that the petitioner show extraordinary 
circumstances which would justify judicial intervention, a presump-
tion in favor of the use of declaratory relief was proposed, and the 
respondent had imposed upon him the responsibility of showing 
special reasons why exhaustion should be required. 
In a later case, Madden v. State Tax Commission,s the Commis-
sioner issued an advisory opinion that the petitioner was subject to 
the state income tax on the conversion of his stock in the merger of 
two corporations. There were 725 other shareholders similarly situated. 
The petitioner sought a declaration that the conversion was not sub-
ject to the tax. The Commission demurred on the ground that the 
petitioner had not yet exhausted his administrative remedies. In 
granting declaratory relief, the Court allowed the petitioner to by-
pass his administrative remedies, stating that it was influenced in the 
case by the novelty of the questions and the large number of persons 
interested.9 This result is consistent with the liberal interpretation 
of Chapter 23lA as proposed by Section 9, and with the discretionary 
power granted by Section 3. The Court, however, warned that a peti-
tioner would normally be required to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.10 
6331 Mass. 688, 122 N.E.2d 356 (1954). 
7Id. at 691, 122 N.E.2d at 359. 
S 333 Mass. 734, 133 N.E.2d 252 (1956). 
9Id. at 740, 133 N.E.2d at 256. 
10 Id. 
J 
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Madden represents a withdrawal from the position adopted in 
Meenes. Although the Court in Madden recognized that exhaustion 
is not an inflexible requirement, it appeared to create a presumption 
in favor of the doctrine and to require the petitioner to carry the 
burden of showing special circumstances that would justify judicial 
intervention. This position prevailed in Squantum Gardens, Inc. v. 
Assessors of Quincy.11 The question presented there was whether a 
party who leased lands from the United States was required to pay a 
municipal property tax. The Court granted declaratory relief without 
requiring exhaustion on the ground that "important and novel ques-
tions are raised about a municipality'S power ... to tax real estate 
leased by the United States to a private corporation."12 In the same 
paragraph, however, the Court stated that generally the petitioner 
would be required to exhaust his administrative remedies unless 
special circumstances were present.1S 
The latter two cases indicate that the doctrine of exhaustion no 
longer presents a serious obstacle to obtaining judicial review. Al-
though the Court requires the petitioner to show "special circum-
stances," justifying an exception to the rule, these circumstances 
include the novelty of the question and the number of people in-
terested in the resolution of the controversy. 
In the Madden case, the fact that 725 people would have to fill out 
tax forms and that the agency would have to process them all gave 
the Court good reason to intervene because it could decide the ques-
tion in one proceeding without necessitating an enormous expenditure 
of time and money. Thus, the number of persons involved is perhaps 
a justifiable reason for not requiring exhaustion, providing, as it does, 
more efficient administration of justice. Nevertheless, the Court is 
also willing to recognize the novelty of the issues as a special circum-
stance. Since many cases reaching the litigation stage present novel 
questions, the exception will be frequently available. But there ap-
pears to be no justifiable reason for disregarding the exhaustion 
requirement merely because of the novelty of the issue raised. To 
dispense with the requirement of exhaustion merely because a novel 
question is presented will detract from the efficient administration of 
justice, as it will require the courts to decide many cases which would 
be more efficiently handled by the agencies in the first instance. 
This is not to say that the doctrine of exhaustion is no longer viable. 
In Winch v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles,14 the respondent assessed 
three points against the petitioner for being at fault in an automobile 
accident causing minor injuries. The petitioner sought a declaration 
that assessment of points was unconstitutional. The Court found that 
the petitioner had failed to establish that there was any penalty im-
posed for acquiring three points or that if there was a penalty, that 
11335 Mass. 440, 140 N.E.2d 482 (1957). 
12Id. at 443, 140 N.E.2d at 485. 
IS Id. 
14334 Mass. 271, 135 N.E.2d 17 (1956). 
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it was anything more than a warning. III Declaratory relief was refused 
on the ground that the petitioner should be required to exhaust his 
right to administrative appeal, since it was not apparent that there 
was danger of any serious harm.16 Thus, it appears that if the injury 
suffered is relatively minor and there is no danger of further injury, 
the Court will require exhaustion. 
Since the presumption in favor of requiring exhaustion remains 
and also since the application of exhaustion is discretionary, where 
the lower court applies the doctrine, the Supreme Judicial Court 
will find it difficult to reverse for abuse of discretion. There is no 
evidence, however, that lower courts will be any more rigorous in 
requiring exhaustion than the Supreme Judicial Court has been. 
§lOA. Termination of controversy. The other major reason for 
refusing declaratory relief, within the discretionary power granted 
in Chapter 231A, Section 3, is that the decree would not terminate 
the controversy. In Foster v. City of Everett,1 the petitioner, a police-
man, sought to retire because of a heart condition and applied for a 
pension. As one of the requirements for obtaining the pension, he 
had to prove to a board composed of the mayor and aldermen that the 
heart condition was a result of his employment. Prior to his employ-
ment, the petitioner had submitted to a physical examination which 
had produced no evidence of the heart condition. Upon application 
for the pension, the petitioner had submitted to another physical 
which verified the existence of the condition. In his appearance before 
the board, the petitioner would be entitled to a presumption that the 
condition was a result of employment if he met the requirements of 
General Laws, Chapter 32, Section 94. After the physical examination 
but before he appeared before the board, the petitioner sought a 
judicial declaration that he was entitled to the presumption. At the 
request of both parties the lower court ruled that the petitioner was 
entitled to the presumption. The respondent appealed, challenging 
that ruling on the basis that the lower court had no right to make it 
because such a ruling would not terminate the controversy. Since the 
question was one of jurisdiction, the Supreme Judicial Court found 
that it could be raised at any stage of the proceedings.2 
The Court pointed out that "it would be a perversion of the pur-
poses of the statute if it were used to obtain decisions on subordinate 
questions in a case. Instead of a dispute resulting in one judicial pro-
ceeding it would divide, amoeba-like, and give rise to many."3 The 
Court, however, ruled that it was within the lower court's discretion 
whether to refuse to grant declaratory relief and that it could not say 
that the lower court had abused its discretion.4 
III Id. at 274, 135 N.E.2d at 18. 
16Id. 
§1O.4. 1334 Mass. 14, 133 N.E.2d 480 (1956), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §21.6. 
2Id. at 16, 133 N.E.2d at 482. 
3Id. at 17. 133 N.E.2d at 483. 
41d. 
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Since the question had already been decided before a proper body, 
there would have been little reason for overturning the decision of 
the lower court and having the petitioner challenge again if the 
board did not allow him the presumption. Also, the respondent was 
not aided in this case by requesting a decision on the matter in the 
lower court. It is difficult, however, to imagine a case more appropriate 
for the application of the termination rule. The fact that the Court 
did not apply termination in this case indicates the wide latitude of 
discretion the Court will permit. 
The most significant departure from the Court's liberal attitude 
toward granting declaratory relief appears in Weinstein v. Chief of 
Police of Fall River.!' The petitioner was the treasurer and sole stock-
holder of a manufacturing business in Fall River. Because of his 
religious beliefs, the plant was closed on Saturdays. Under General 
Laws, Chapter 136, Section 9, the chief of police had discretion "upon 
such terms and conditions as he deems reasonable [to issue permits to 
work on Sundays where the work] ... in his judgment could not be 
performed on any other day without serious suffering, loss, damage, 
or public inconvenience." The petitioner alleged that his manu-
facturing business was indistinguishable from those of other firms to 
which respondent had been granting such permits and yet that re-
spondent refused to grant him a permit. The petitioner also alleged 
that the sole ground for the respondent's refusal was that he inter-
preted the statute as excluding the petitioner from obtaining a permit 
because he closed on Saturday. The bill sought a declaration that the 
respondent's interpretation was incorrect or that if it was correct, that 
the statute was unconstitutional. The respondent demurred generally, 
alleging as one ground that a decree would not terminate the con-
troversy. The lower court sustained the demurrer and entered a final 
decree dismissing the bill. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the respondent's demurrer 
did not admit the general assertion of facts and that "without specific 
facts the Court cannot determine and terminate the controversy."6 
It was stated: 
The allegation that the sole ground for his [respondent's] refusal 
is the closing of the corporate plaintiff's place of business on 
Saturdays is not a substitute for showing that the corporate plain-
tiff is otherwise entitled to a permit . 
. . . A declaration as to the correctness of the ground of refusal 
attributed to the defendant chief of police would not be decisive 
of the entire controversy. The plaintiff corporation would not at 
once become entitled to a permit. The chief of police would .still 
have a discretion to exercise.7 
G 344 Mass. 314, 182 N.E.2d 525 (1962). noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§14.8. 
6Id. at 317. 182 N.E.2d at 527. 
7Id. at 318. 182 N.E.2d at 527. 
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Although it is true that petitioner had not alleged the specific facts 
which made his firm indistinguishable from other firms, he had al-
leged that they were indistinguishable and should have been allowed 
to prove that allegation at trial. If he were able to prove it, then a 
decree declaring the respondent's interpretation valid or invalid would 
have terminated the controversy. If the Court was merely looking for 
a more specific statement of facts, it should have allowed the petitioner 
to amend. 
A possible explanation for the Court's decision is that the lower 
court has a wide range of discretion in deciding whether to refuse 
relief on the ground that a decree would not terminate the contro-
versy. Since the allegations of the petitioner were rather confusing 
and did not allege the specific facts which made his business indis-
tinguishable from others, the Court could not say, as a matter of law, 
that the lower court had abused its discretion.8 
§lO.5. Conclusion. This chapter has not attempted to examine 
all the problems which may arise in using declaratory relief to review 
administrative action. Rather it has focused on specific problems that 
have been the subject of discussion in the Supreme Judicial Court to 
see what resolutions have been adopted and then to see what trend 
these resolutions forecast for future decisions. 
In this regard, it may be said that the Court has adopted a flexible 
position and a strong attempt has been made by the judiciary to 
function as a preventive as well as a curative body. One of the 
strongest factors motivating the Court to grant relief appears to be a 
desire to prevent injury and resolve legal uncertainty, wherever pos-
sible. At times this concern with the danger of injury to the petitioner 
has led the Court to overlook the proper functioning of the administra-
tive process. This was exemplified in the Frontier1 case where relief 
was granted against the agency on the basis of an investigatory report. 
Admittedly, the case arose under unusual circumstances but the hold-
ing would allow the courts to assume a function which should clearly 
be left within administrative control. Although the prevention of 
injury should remain an important consideration, it must be balanced 
against the proper functioning of the administrative process. A reading 
of Frontier which would allow the court to interfere in the agency's 
investigation would greatly impair the agency's ability to fulfill its 
duty to the public and should not be followed in the future. 
This desire to prevent injury has also had its ramifications in de-
termining the type of interest which must be impaired before relief 
will be granted. In Massachusetts the main controversy as to this 
particular question has been whether relief should be granted if one's 
8 Another possible explanation of the opinion is that the Court employed the 
termination rule in order to avoid deciding the difficult and controversial issue 
raised by the petitioner. 
§IO.5. 1 Frontier Research Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 1967 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 137, 222 N.E.2d 854. 
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interest in being free from illegally created competition is interfered 
with. The Court's position on this question appears to be changing. 
In Nantucket Boat,2 the Court stated that the mere interest in being 
free from illegally created competition was not sufficient to maintain 
the suit. "Special circumstances" were necessary to obviate this rule. 
In South Shore,s the Court found the special circumstances, relying on 
a statutory purpose to protect a bank's competitive position and the 
fact that the bank was subject to regulation. If the latter circumstance 
is sufficient, then many individuals whose competitive position is im-
paired by agency action will be allowed to challenge that action. 
This would be a step towards adopting the doctrine that any party 
who can show economic loss arising from increased competition 
should be able to challenge the agency action which caused it, both 
to protect his own interest and the public's. The Court's concern with 
preventing injury may lead it to adopt such a position. 
Although the dicta in KeZZey4 that a threat of enforcement is neces-
sary to create a controversy indicates a contrary approach, the Court 
has been willing to grant review of advisory opinions even though the 
administrative body rendering the opinion has not yet made any 
threat of enforcement. This, of course, is a logical extension of the 
preventive role the Court appears to have assumed, and there seems 
no good reason for retreating from this position. 
The Court's desire to avoid injury has also extended itself in the 
application of the exhaustion doctrine. Whenever the petitioner can 
show that more than minor injury will result from the agency's action, 
the Court as in Squantum Gardens,!) seems willing to dispense with 
the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies and to grant 
immediate judicial review. Again this is essentially a balancing of the 
proper functioning of the administrative process against the preventive 
judicial role. Since the Court has become so concerned with prevent-
ing injury, any injury will generally be considered important enough 
to outweigh the necessity of first resorting to the administrative 
remedies. 
While the doctrine of termination of controversy does not raise any 
questions peculiar to administrative action, it may be said that the 
lower court has a wide range of discretion as to whether the decree 
will or will not terminate the controversy. Thus, the Court in the 
Foster6 case allowed relief upon an issue to be raised in a future hear-
ing, in effect permitting that hearing to be divided "amoeba-like." 
2 Nantucket Boat Inc. v. Woods Hole. Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket S.S. 
Auth'y, 354 Mass. 551, 188 N.E.2d 476 (1963). 
8 South Shore Nat'l Bank v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 337 Mass. 615, 151 
N.E.2d 70 (1958). 
4 Kelley v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 351 Mass. 187, 218 N.E.2d 
130 (1966). 
1\ Squantum Gardens, Inc. v. Assessors of Quincy, 335 Mass. 440, 140 N.E.2d 482 
(1957). 
6 Foster v. City of Everett, 334 Mass. 14, 133 N.E.2d 480 (1956). 
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Generally, it may be said that the Court has carefully heeded the 
admonition of Section 9 of Chapter 23lA that the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act be "liberally construed and administered." This has been a 
significant factor in making the declaratory judgment the most im-
portant remedy for securing judicial review of administrative action.7 
N. PETER LAREAU 
7 The utility of adding a prayer for declaratory relief to one's petition for 
judicial review of administrative action is well illustrated by comparing Natick 
Trust Co. v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 337 Mass. 615, 151 N.E.2d 70 (1958), with 
South Shore Nat'l Bank v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 351 Mass. 363, 220 N.E.2d 
899. In both cases, the fact situations were nearly identical. In the Natick case the 
Court held that review was not available either under Section 14 of the State 
Administrative Procedure Act or as a writ of certiorari. In South Shore, the peti-
tioner sought review by a petition for writ of certiorari and by a petition for 
declaratory relief. The Court again held that a petition for writ of certiorari did 
not lie. The Court, however, granted declaratory relief. The two cases seem to 
provide ample reason for including a petition for declaratory relief whenever 
seeking judicial review of administrative action. 
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